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ARTICLE

Finding Opportunities to Combat the Climate
Change Migration Crisis: The Potential of the
“Adaptation Approach”1
MARIYA GROMILOVA

I.

INTRODUCTION

The time when climate change was primarily the concern of
scientists is long gone. Today, the “human face” of climate change
is visible to the world through the many people that suffer its
consequences, such as sea-level rise, droughts, cyclones, and
tsunamis. These impacts present a threat to lives and livelihoods
and will induce millions of people to move, some of them
permanently. Though the evidence of this phenomenon remains
1. This article builds upon my previous research conducted as a part of my
doctorate dissertation and finalises my research project. The preceding
publications: MARIYA GROMILOVA & NICOLA J ÄGERS , Climate Change Induced
Displacement and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ADAPTATION LAW (Edward Elgar & Johann Verschuuren eds. 2013);
Mariya Gromilova, Can the EU Seasonal Workers Directive Alleviate the
Pending Crisis of Climate-induced Displacement? Lessons from Oceania, EUR.
LAB. L. J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Lessons from Oceania]; Mariya Gromilova,
Rescuing Tuvaluans: Towards an ICJ Advisory Opinion on the International
Legal Obligations to Protect the Environment and Human Rights of Populations
Affected by Climate Change, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, (2015)
[hereinafter Rescuing Tuvaluans]; Mariya Gromilova, Revisiting Planned
Relocation as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: The Added Value of a
Human Rights-Based Approach, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 76 (2014) [hereinafter
Revisiting Planned Relocation].
 PhD Researcher, Department of European and International Public Law,
Tilburg Law School, Tilburg Sustainability Centre, the Netherlands; email:
M.Gromilova@uvt.nl.
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limited, in its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is in the high agreement that
climate change will increase the displacement of people over the
course of the 21st Century.2 Due to the fact that climate changerelated impacts are to a large extent irreversible, adaptation
might be the only available and appropriate response, according
to the IPCC.3
Given the scope and turbulence of the issue, the topic of
climate change migration is unsurprisingly high on the agenda of
politicians and academics. The issue is multifaceted and
continuingly challenges with fundamental questions such as:
what is happening and where? How many people will have to
move? Where will they go? Who is responsible for helping them?
What is their legal status, etc.?
The attempts to generate knowledge and reach
understanding in order to answer these questions are numerous.
Regardless of the efforts of empirical research groups, political
lobbying, research institutes, international organizations and
NGOs, the success is poor. International law is also of little help,
since there are normative gaps that prevent people induced to
move by climate change from being considered under existing
frameworks or from acquiring a defined legal status; these gaps
also prevent the establishment of a mechanism or mechanisms
for their protection.4 The conceptual difficulties, from both
2. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY
20 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC 2014].
3. By “irreversible” it is meant that even when all the GHG emissions be
stopped today, the marginal changes will be seen only in 30–40 years. See
GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 1; see also Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability,
at 19 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC 2007].
4. Oli Brown, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, PUB. NO. 31, MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 36 (2008); Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate
Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60, 63 (2010) [hereinafter Preparing for a
Warmer World]; David Hodgkinson et al., The Hour When the Ship Comes in: A
Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 69,
75–77 (2010); see also GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1; Frank Biermann &
Ingrid Boas, Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol, ENV’T:
SCI & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 11 (2008),
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/NovemberDecember%202008/Biermann-Boas-full.html
[http://perma.cc/PRZ7-WLP4]
[hereinafter Protecting Climate Refugees]; Jekwu Ikeme, Equity, Environmental
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theoretical and legal perspectives, are multiple and originate in
the complex nature of the phenomenon.
However, apart from many limitations of law, politics, and
scientific and technological progress, the debates on climateinduced population movement have achieved several significant
results that offer opportunities. Some of them are yet to be seen
(the negotiations in Paris and potential inclusion in its outcomedocument of the commitment for the developed states to “[a]ssist[]
in providing organized migration and planned relocation” due to
climate change),5 while others have already gained support
amongst policy-makers and academics. This is the case for the
2010 Cancun Adaptation Agreement, which differentiated
between different types of climate change-induced mobility by
acknowledging migration, induced displacement, and planned
relocation as climate change adaptation strategies; the
Agreement invited the Parties to enhance understanding and
cooperation with regard to these adaptation strategies.6 The
Cancun Adaptation Framework reemphasized the obligation of
adaptation under Article 4(1)(b) of the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and invited Parties to
cooperate regarding specific actions on the national, regional, and
international levels when it comes to the issue of population
movement due to climate change.7 It has also suggested for the
first time that migration, displacement, and planned relocation
can become part of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).8 As Kälin
and Schrepfer put it, the Cancun Adaptation Agreement is “the
Justice and Sustainability: Incomplete Approaches in Climate Change Politics,
13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 195 (2003).
5. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/ADP/2015/1, at 32 (Feb. 25, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/
adp2/eng/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/89TD-FN4A] [hereinafter Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action].
6. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties
on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December
2010, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter
Cancun Agreements].
7. See generally id.
8. Id. ¶ 14; see also Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, Protecting People Crossing Boarders in the Context of Climate Change:
Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2012/01, at 49–50
(2012).
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most important step thus far” made at the international level
regarding the issue of climate-induced population movement.9
The Cancun Agreement is a non-binding instrument included
within the UNFCCC framework, which nevertheless has
implications that go far beyond the single agreement. As I argue
here, viewing an issue of climate-induced population movement
as a matter of adaptation, i.e., approaching it through the
adaptation approach, allows us to integrate the opportunities
offered by other relevant legal regimes. This ultimately allows us
to breach the normative gaps peculiar to fragmented
international law and conceptualize the complex issue of climateinduced population movement.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the benefits of
applying adaptation approach in conceptualising the issue of
climate-induced population movement and its potential to
respond to the main priorities to be addressed in the context of
population movement induced by climate change. This article
proceeds with Section 2, which provides an overview of the main
difficulties to conceptualization of the issue of climate induced
population movement from empirical and legal perspectives.
Section 3, drawing upon the state of play presented above,
identifies the main priorities that have to be addressed. Section 4
focuses on the opportunities the Cancun Adaptation Agreement
offers. First, however, I assess in this section the benefits of
treating population movement as a matter of adaptation to find
out how the adaptation approach can be utilized to integrate
relevant provisions of various legal frameworks and how an
effective response to the pending climate migration crisis can be
developed and implemented.
A. Definitions
The two basic concepts used throughout the article are
“climate-induced population movement” and “adaptation
approach to climate-induced population movement.”
Climate-induced population movement: This is the term
used throughout this article, and stands for a movement of
persons in response to climate change impacts (both sudden-onset
9. Id. at 49.
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and slow-onset) of both temporary and permanent character in
the form of migration, induced-displacement, or planned
relocation.
Adaptation approach to climate-induced population
movement: Adaptation, when it comes to people, is understood as
“the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its
effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial
opportunities.”10 When it comes to adaptation in the context of
climate-induced population movement, the Cancun Adaptation
Framework expressed that migration, induced-displacement, and
The
planned relocation can be this general adjustment.11
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement is
defined, for the purpose of this article, as a proactive approach in
which migration, induced-displacement, and planned relocation
are used as adaptation measures that allow people to adjust to
changing climate by moving from places at risk.

II. STATE OF PLAY AND DIFFICULTIES IN
CONCEPTUALIZATION
Population movement in response to climate change has been
under the spotlight of politicians and academics for at least the
last decade.12 The predictions on the scale and the magnitude of
the issue are quite alarming, and, depending on the perception of
climate change as a factor for migration, range between 25
million and 1 billion.13 There is agreement that climate change
10. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks of
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,
Annex II: Glossary of Terms, at 556 (2012).
11. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14(f).
12. ÉTIENNE PIGUET ET AL., MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2–6 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2011).
13. See U.N. Secretary-General, Climate Change and its Possible Security
Implications, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009); CHRISTIAN AID, THE
HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS 22 (2007); Norman Myers,
Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE 752, 757
(2003); Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Accommodating Migration to Promote
Adaptation to Climate Change 14–15 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5270,
2010); François Gemenne, Environmental Changes and Migration Flows:
Normative Frameworks and Policy Responses 158 (Apr. 3, 2009) (unpublished
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will most severely affect people from the developing and leastdeveloped countries, already vulnerable, most depended on
natural capital, and with the least financial and physical capacity
to adapt to climate change.14 Ironically, these people most
affected by climate change are also the least responsible for
emissions of greenhouse gases.15 This suggests that countries
affected by climate change will probably not be able to manage
the problem without assistance, and also that there is at least a
moral obligation on the part of those who have contributed to
climate change to provide assistance. While there is a debate as
to whether this assistance is a legal obligation or is entirely
voluntary, it is in fact in the best interests of the developed
countries to provide assistance.16 Unmanaged, sporadic, last
minute movements are associated with multiple risks, including
political and economic instability, security concerns, and
widespread human rights implications not only for those who are
induced to move but also for receiving and neighbouring areas.17
This complex state of play, and the fundamental questions it
puts forward, demands answers and solutions. There are,
however, numerous difficulties in conceptualizing the issue from
both empirical and legal perspectives.
A. Issue of Causation
First, there is the fundamental issue of causation. The
empirical studies that have been undertaken show the complexity
of the relationship between environmental factors and
migration.18 Climate change is only one factor among several
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Liège), for different estimations and two
different schools of thoughts (maximalists and minimalists).
14. Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities
and Limits, in CLIMATE C HANGE AND DISPLACEMENT : MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 37, 39 (Jane McAdam ed., Hart Publ’g, 2010) [hereinafter
Migration as Adaptation]; see also Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 4–5.
15. Brown, supra note 4, at 31.
16. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 77, 94–96.
17. See Brendan Gogarty, Climate-Change Displacement: Current Legal
Solutions to Future Global Problems, J.L. INFO. & SCI., Dec. 2011, at 176–77.
18. See Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACHFOR), CLIMATE CHANGE, ENV’T & MIGRATION ALLIANCE, http://www.ccemaportal.org/article/read/each-for-project-publications
[http://perma.cc/2JUGBVBW] [hereinafter CCEMA] (“EACH-FOR was a two year long research project
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others in explaining migration dynamics,19 and is closely linked
to economic, political, and social factors.20 Therefore,
environmental degradation is undoubtedly a driver of
displacement, but it is unlikely that it is the unique cause, as
other conditions, such as labour market opportunities, are always
taken into account in people’s decisions to migrate.21 Causation
is even more complex when personal perceptions of risks,
vulnerability, and the capacity to adapt are taken into account.22
Therefore, long and heated discussions on causation allow us, at
best, to conclude that environmental degradation is an “impact
multiplier and accelerator to other drivers of human mobility”
rather than a predominant cause for migration.23 Furthermore,
as Etienne Piguet et al. argues, environmental factors are not
only intertwined with other factors for decisions to migrate but
can also be a cause or effect of other factor that gives a totally
different conceptual context to the problem.24 This is the case
with migration in response to the conflict over scarce resources,
for example.
Due to the uncertainties in the understanding of causation it
is hard to identify the magnitude of the phenomena, estimate the
number of people that will move, and draw projections for the

within the frames of FP6 (Priority 8.1 – Policy-oriented research) of the
European Commission.”). See generally INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION,
ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE (Frank Laczko &
Christine Aghazarm eds., 2009); Rafael Reuveny, Ecomigration and Violent
Conflict: Case Studies and Public Policy Implications, 36 HUM. ECOLOGY 1
(2007).
19. Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 30
INT’L MIGRATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 105, 110–13 (1996).
20. See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE:
FUTURE
CHALLENGES
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
44–54
(2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28
7717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQ9U-4LCR]; Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide:
Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer, 23 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 1, 10 (2011) [hereinafter Swimming Against the Tide]; Barnett &
Webber, supra note 13, at 5–6.
21. Benoit Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate Induced
Migration: Proposal for an International Legal Framework, 22 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 366 (2011).
22. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 12–13.
23. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 7.
24. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 12.
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future. Though, the empirical evidence remains scarce,25 there
are, however, significant efforts to explore the extent of the issue.
26 These studies confirm the reality of the issue, though also
acknowledging its complexity the mixed character of push
factors.27 Furthermore, in its Fifth Assessment Report the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is in the
high agreement that climate change will increase the
displacement of people over the course of the 21st Century.28 A
deeper understanding of the issue and further empirical research
are nevertheless required.
B. Absence of Single Pattern
Second, population mobility in response to climate change
can take different patterns. Migration varies depending on the
length of time and distance. For example, migration can be
temporary or permanent; it can also be internal or cross borders.
Most researchers currently agree that most of the climate
induced population movement will predominantly be temporary
and will happen internally.29 These types of mobility will occur
mostly in reaction to sudden-onset disasters and rapid-onset
phenomena (such as cyclones, typhoons and floods).30 Slow-onset

25. Stephen Castles, Afterword: What Now? Climate-Induced Displacement
after Copenhagen, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 239, 243.
26. See generally KOKO WARNER ET AL., WHERE THE RAIN FALLS: CLIMATE
CHANGE, FOOD AND LIVELIHOOD SECURITY, AND MIGRATION (2012),
http://www.axa.com/lib/axa/uploads/wheretherainfalls/Wtrf_ExecutiveSummary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ULZ4-K35Y]; WORLD BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (Quentin
Wodon et al. eds., 2014); CCEMA, supra note 18.
27. See generally W ARNER ET AL ., supra note 26; WORLD BANK, supra note 26;
CCEMA, supra note 18.
28. IPCC 2014, supra note 2, at 20.
29. Jane McAdam, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Climate Change
Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards,
U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/03, at 8–10 (2010); Swimming Against the Tide, supra
note 20, at 8, 11–12; Sheila C. McAnaney, Sinking Islands? Formulating a
Realistic Solution to Climate Change Displacement, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1172,
1178–79 (2012) [hereinafter Sinking Islands].
30. Walter Kälin, Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 14, at 81, 82; PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 15.
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impacts of climate change will also induce population movement,
which is expected to be gradual and essentially also internal.31
There will, however, be cross-border movements, some of
which will be permanent in nature (such as in cases of slow-onset
environmental degradation or, in cases of small island states,
where there is a risk of submergence of the entire territory).32
Since there is no clear pattern of climate-related migration,
and with many different types of movement possible, the
conceptualization is hampered by the fact that each scenario will
require a separate approach with specific concerns to be
addressed.33
C. Absence of Single Form
Third, mobility can also take various forms, such as
voluntary
migration,
induced
displacement,
or
34
resettlement/planned relocation. As Piguet et al. remarks: “It is
indeed extremely difficult to capture the decision-making process
among potential migrants and to understand why, how and when
people decide to leave.”35 The distinction between forced and
voluntary, therefore, often stays blurred.36 This presents further
obstacles in conceptualization and legal protection since, as
Warner emphasizes, “[t]he needs of affected people vary across
different types of human mobility: migration, displacement and
planned relocation.”37

31. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 8 ; Sinking Islands, supra
note 29, at 1179.
32. Kälin, supra note 30, at 85.
33. See id. at 85–86. Kälin distinguished five different scenarios of climateinduced migration, addressing displacement following: sudden-onset disasters,
slow-onset environmental degradation, the disappearance of the state (small
island states), displacement from the areas acknowledged as “high-risk zones
too dangerous for human habitation,” and “unrest seriously disturbing public
order, violence or even armed conflict.” Id.
34. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14.
35. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 15.
36. Id.
37. KOKO WARNER ET AL., CHANGING CLIMATE, MOVING PEOPLE: FRAMING
MIGRATION, DISPLACEMENT AND PLANNED RELOCATION 8 (2013).
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D. Regional Aspect
Fourth, conceptualization of the issue is hampered by the fact
that climate-induced population movement has a strong regional
character.38
The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report identified that risks
associated with climate change are “regionally differentiated” and
“unevenly distributed.”39 The specific context of the region often
impacts the length of movement and specific obstacles faced by
those who have to relocate. For instance, while migration from
small island states will not involve big numbers of people, it
might, however, be cross-border, with no opportunity for
islanders to return. In Africa, migration is mainly happening
within the continent but is hampered by the number of people
Governments in
affected, conflicts, and political clashes.40
different countries can also have different approaches in
managing mobility, with some stimulating it and some deterring
it.41
Furthermore, data about the nature and extent of
population movements from some regions is less available than
from others.42
Although, as some academics argue, this regional context
creates a great potential for addressing the issue,43 it also
impedes the process of conceptualization.

38. See generally PEOPLE ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: THE REGIONAL
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON MIGRATION (Etienne Piguet & Frank
Laczko eds., 2014).
39. IPCC 2014, supra note 2, at 12.
40. Nancy C. Tolentino & João Peixoto, Migration, Remittances and
Development in Africa: The Case of Lusophone Countries, ACP OBSERVATORY ON
MIGRATION 5, ACP Doc. ACPOBS/2011/BN03 (2011), https://publications.iom.int/
books/migration-remittances-and-development-africa-case-lusophone-countries
[https://perma.cc/M6F8-7ND9].
41. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 18.
42. Such a lack of data, for instance, is identified in regard to Asia and
Pacific. See ASIA DEV. BANK, POLICY OPTIONS TO SUPPORT CLIMATE-INDUCED
MIGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, at ix, 4 (2012), http://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/29662/addressing-climate-change-migration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RFE5-XRGE?type=source].
43. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 25–26 (arguing that
dealing with the problem on the regional level by promoting migration through
regional and bilateral agreements is beneficial); Angela Williams, Turning the
Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y,
502, 518 (2008) (same).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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E. Legal Gaps
The four conceptual complications listed above make it
extremely hard to create a definition, estimate the numbers of
people moving, and draw prognoses for the future. This in turn
poses difficulties in finding a legal approach, giving legal status
to people moving due to climate change, and establishing
protection mechanisms. Below the limitations of the relevant
legal frameworks and the few opportunities they offer are
analyzed.
1. Refugee Law
Although the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) is the most relevant
legal framework at the international level for the protection of
populations displaced across borders, it is also commonly agreed
that it is unfit for the problem of climate-induced population
The definition of “refugee” in the Refugee
movement.44
Convention includes three main elements: the person is outside of
the country of origin, due to persecution based on a closed
number of grounds, and the person is unable or unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of their country.45 People migrating due
to climate change and environmental issues do not fall within
this definition. Besides the requirement of exile, which will not be
fulfilled by those who move internally, climate change cannot be
categorised as persecution, since persecution is commonly
connected to the actions of government.46 Furthermore, the
Refugee Convention limits the grounds for persecution to race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion, and does not leave much room for
44. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 80–89; Kälin & Schrepfer, supra
note 8, at 31–34; JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44-48 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); see also Brown, supra
note 4, at 13–15.
45. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, ¶ 2, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
46. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, at 13 (Dec.
2011) (“Persecution is normally related to actions by the authorities of a
country.”).
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interpretation.47
Meanwhile, the nature of climate change
impacts is, to a large extent, indiscriminative and is not tied to
particular characteristics such as a person’s background or
beliefs.48
As Kälin and Schrepfer demonstrate, there are, however, a
few situations where people displaced by climate change could fit
under the refugee definition. Among these are the “situations of
violence, serious human rights violations or armed conflict
triggered by disputes over shrinking natural resources . . . if
persecutory measures are based on the race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion of
affected persons.”49 Other cases could be when a government
denies certain groups of people assistance or protection against
climate change, or when the climate change-related policy of a
government has a discriminative impact on specific groups of
people.50 In such cases, it might be possible to establish a causeeffect relationship between the impacts of climate change on
people and governmental actions. Nevertheless, this kind of
correlation will not be found in the majority of cases of climateinduced population movement.
It is important to note that several regional instruments
contain a broader definition of a refugee. Among notable
examples are the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
(“OAU Convention”),51 the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on

47. Williams, supra note 43, at 508.
48. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 85.
49. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 33; see also J ON B ARNETT & NEIL
ADGER , SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING
5-8 (2005) (discussing the impact of relative poverty on the potential for armed
conflict); DAN SMITH & J ANANI VIVEKANANDA , INT’L ALERT, A CLIMATE OF
CONFLICT: THE LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND WAR 9–22 (2007)
(discussing the potential for armed conflicts due to climate change).
50. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 32–33; Jane McAdam, From
Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 579, 591–93
(2009) [hereinafter From Economic Refugees].
51. Organization of African Unity [OAU] Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1, ¶ 2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S.
45 (including any person compelled to leave his/her country because of “external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality”).
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Refugees of Latin America (“Cartagena Declaration”),52 and the
1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in Arab
Countries (“Arab Convention”).53 Furthermore, people induced to
movement by climate change can arguably find protection under
EU legislation. The EU Temporary Protection Directive provides
temporary protection in the situation of “mass-influxes” of
“persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of,
The EU Qualification
systematic” or “endemic violence.”54
Directive allows for subsidiary protection of applicants who do not
qualify for Convention refugee protection and therefore may
receive subsidiary protection if it is considered that the applicant
faces “a real risk of suffering serious harm.”55
However, none of the regional instruments (the OAU
Convention, the Cartagena Declaration, the Arab Convention) are
understood to cover climate migrants nor are they supported by
opinio juris.56 When it comes to the EU, the Temporary

52. Org, of Am. States, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, art. 3, ¶ 3 (Nov.
22, 1984) (extending the definition of refugee to persons who have fled their
country “because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public
order”).
53. League of Arab States, Arab Convention on Regulating Status of
Refugees in the Arab Countries, art. 1 (1994) (defining a refugee as “[a]ny
person who unwillingly takes refuge in a country other than his country of
origin or his habitual place of residence because of the sustained aggression
against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the
occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of
public order in the whole country or any part thereof”).
54. Council Directive 2001/55, art. 2(c), 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12, 14 (EC)
[hereinafter Temporary Protection Directive] (describing minimum standards for
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons
and measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof).
55. Council Directive 2004/83, art. 2(e), 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14 (EC)
[hereinafter Qualification Directive] (describing minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the
content of the protection granted); Vikram Kolmannskog & Finn Myrstad,
Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law, 11 EUR. J. MIGRATION &
L. 313, 319 (2009).
56. As regard to the Arab Convention, no States have ratified the Arab
Convention and therefore it has no legal force. The application of the definition
of the OAU Convention is not supported by the opinio juris of African states.
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Protection Directive offers some temporary opportunities for
people forcibly displaced by climate change in cases when a
qualified majority of the Council will qualify the flight of
displaced people as a “mass influx.”57 The Temporary Protection
Directive is not a solution for individuals in need of protection nor
for those who need to stay longer or permanently.58 The
subsidiary protection under Article 15 of the Qualification
Directive for people displaced by climate change is questionable.
It is highly challenging to show that these people are at “a real
risk of suffering serious harm” in the sense of “serious harm” as
defined in the Directive.59 The protection will, therefore, mainly
lean on the principle of non-refoulement,60 which is addressed
further.
Interestingly, whereas international and regional refugee law
can be considered as failing in providing protection to people
induced to move by climate change, national laws in certain
countries have been more successful in dealing with the problem.
Currently, two states, Finland and Sweden, have adopted asylum
laws granting subsidiary protection for “environmental
migrants.”61 These regulations are an exception to the rule and
have not been in frequent use. Nevertheless, the Scandinavian
example shows that individual states have the potential to issue
immigration and asylum policy to provide legal protection for
environmental migrants.62
The Cartagena Declaration in practice has not been understood as covering
natural disasters. See McAdam, supra note 29, at 14–15.
57. Kolmannskog & Myrstad, supra note 55, at 317.
58. Id. at 318.
59. Id. at 319.
60. Id. at 323. The non-refoulement principle is delt with in the following
section.
61. 4 ch. 2–2a §§ Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.) (extending to anyone who
has left his or her native country and does not wish to return there because he
or she: (1) has a fear of the death penalty or torture is in need of protection as a
result of war or other serious conflicts in the country, and (2) is unable to return
to the native country because of an environmental disaster); 6 ch. 88a § Aliens
Act (SFS: 1152/2010) (Fin.) (providing an “alien residing in Finland is issued
with a residence permit on the basis humanitarian protection” if they cannot
return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster).
62. See generally Benjamin Glahn, “Climate Refugees”? Addressing the
International Legal Gaps, I NT ’L B. ASS ’N (2009), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442
[http://perma.cc/V7Y3-Z4H8].
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Even though regional or national instruments could give
opportunities, approaching the issue of climate-induced
displacement through the refugee regime does not cover those
who will be displaced within the state and does not allow for a
proactive approach, meaning that protection only applies after
the displacement takes place. Furthermore, it only covers cases of
sudden-onset events and does not allow for the protection of
people affected by slow-onset environmental degradation.
It is also crucial to note that fitting people displaced by
climate change into the refugee regime distorts the principally
different nature of the issue. The case of people affected by
climate change involves different types of moral and legal
responsibility. As McAdam puts it:
Whereas refugees within the Refugee Convention definition flee
their own government (or actors that the government is unable or
unwilling to protect them from), a person fleeing the effects of
climate change is not escaping his or her government, but rather
is seeking a refuge from—yet within—states that have
contributed to climate change.63

People displaced by climate change are willing to have the
protection of their country and in many cases do not want to
leave.64
2. Human Rights Law
Taking the number of human rights that are threatened
during climate-induced population movements, the relevance of
human rights law is beyond doubt.65
In 2008, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted Resolution
7/23, which was the first U.N. Resolution to recognize “that
climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to
people and communities around the world and has significant
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.”66 In 2009,
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the International Council on Human Rights
63.
64.
65.
66.

From Economic Refugees, supra note 50, at 592.
Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 85.
Id. at 81–87.
Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78 (Mar. 28, 2008).
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Policy (ICHRP) adopted Resolution 10/4, which addressed the
relationship between human rights and climate change in
international law was.67 This resolution noted “climate changerelated impacts have a range of implications, both direct and
indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights.”68
The list of human rights that can be implicated during
climate-induced movement is extensive and includes, among
others, the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to
water, the right to health, the right to adequate housing, the
right to take part in cultural life, the right to self-determination,
and the right to development.69
The advantage of human rights law when it comes to the
issue of climate-induced movement is that it applies to all people
regardless of whether one is displaced or not. Therefore, the issue
of causality, which is one of the central conceptual challenges, is
avoided.70 However, there are further obstacles. These obstacles
vary depending on the type and the character of movement.
a. Displacement within the State
It is the duty of states to respect, protect, and fulfil all human
rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their political,
economic, and cultural systems. Under human rights law, states
have the primary legal obligation towards those within its
territory and jurisdiction.71 The normative framework for those
displaced within a state is therefore better developed than for
those who have crossed borders due to climate change. First of
all, there are hard-law instruments, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the

67. Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (Mar. 20, 2009).
68. Id.
69. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 81–87. This list of
implicated human rights is not exhaustive since the nature of human rights is
such that all of them are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible.
70. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 88.
71. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR]; John H. Knox, Climate Change
and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 196 (2009); see also International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which fixate the obligations of states towards
individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction.72
Second, the soft-law protection applies. People who are forcibly
displaced internally fall under the remit of the 1998 Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement.73 The movement has to be of
a forced character, which covers the situations of sudden-onset
environmental impacts. The Guiding Principles is a soft-law
instrument that has no binding power on governments. Third, it
has to be taken into account that most of the states affected by
climate change and within which the displacement of people will
take place are developing or least-developed countries—
financially weak and with a poor capacity to ensure human rights
of their populations.74 Furthermore, this instrument does not
apply to those who move due to slow-onset environmental
degradation in a pre-emptive manner.
Concerning those who are displaced within the state due to
the slow-onset environmental degradation, states have the
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of all
people within their jurisdiction.75 However, the point made above
72. ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE
UDHR AND BEYOND 49, 71–73 (Mashood Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds.,
2010).
73. See Francis M. Deng (Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General), Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11,
1998). At the regional level there is also the 2009 Kampala Convention. African
Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa (Oct. 23, 2009). This instrument is legally binding for state
parties and covers those displaced by natural disaster. Importantly, the
Kampala Convention lays down the responsibility of governments that have
failed to act according to their human rights obligations in preventing disasters
or impacts where such harm is foreseeable. See id. Already twenty-two countries
have ratified the Convention. The Kampala Convention, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING CENTRE, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/
kampala-convention/ [http://perma.cc/J3JT-SFFJ]. This instrument, however,
remains outside the scope of this article, since it does not cover the movement in
response to the slow-onset environmental degradation and pre-emptive
movement.
74. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS , Climate Change and International Human Rights
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 29, 38 (Edward
Elgar ed., 2012).
75. Eur. Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights,
art. 1 (2013); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of
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is equally relevant here. These are usually developing countries
where access to justice often proves problematic.76
b. Crossing the Border
If a person flees across a national border due to
environmental factors, this person will be entitled to general
human rights guarantees in a receiving state in line with the
human rights obligations of that state.77 Since people induced to
move by climate change probably will search for a job and,
therefore, can be considered as “engage[d] in remunerated
activity,”78 the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families is a
relevant instrument. However, first of all, this Convention does
not provide for any rights to be admitted to a foreign territory and
to remain there.79 Secondly, the search for a job in most cases
will probably not be the first need for displaced people, since
finding a place to stay and ensuring that they have access to food
and water will likely be higher priorities.80
While most of the people displaced by climate change will not
have a right to be admitted into and to remain on the territory of
other state, they can find protection against being removed. This
can be possible under complementary protection that follows from
the principle of non-refoulement, which has been enshrined in
several human rights provisions such as the prohibition of torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatment.81 According to the
principle of non-refoulement, asylum seekers already present
within a jurisdiction cannot be removed by that state to a country
where the person will face a real risk of persecution or exposure
to torture, inhuman treatment, or other serious human rights

the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶¶ 3,
10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 31]; ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2.
76. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 93–94.
77. ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2(1).
78. G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 49, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 1990), http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm [https://perma.cc/FG9Y-PKRM].
79. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 75.
80. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 35.
81. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 96–97.
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violations.82 As Kälin and Schrepfer observe, “the doctrinal basis
of this jurisprudence is the idea that in all such cases it is not the
behavior of the state of destination that is being adjudicated but
that of the state whose authorities order the expulsion or
deportation.”83 However, a case has been decided in which it was
acknowledged that deportation would be an inhuman act based
on actions of the destination country. In D v United Kingdom, it
was ruled that the removal of an HIV-infected person back to St.
Kitts would reduce “already limited life expectancy and subject
[the person] to acute mental and physical suffering.”84 Arguably,
people forcibly displaced by climate change may also be exposed
to the “life threatening situation” if they are sent back.85
However, it is doubtful that complementary protection
following the principle of non-refoulement can offer meaningful
protection to people displaced by climate change. As has been
emphasized in D v United Kingdom, the circumstances of the case
are “very exceptional” and, as Kolmannskog and Myrstad point
out, the subsequent case-law has interpreted the possibilities
offered by the case quite restrictively.86
Moreover, the
prohibition of sending people back is not giving people any rights
to be admitted. This means that people will expose themselves to
numerous live-threatening situations in attempts to cross
borders.87
c. Extraterritorial Obligations
It has been discussed that in both cases (when relocation
happens within the state or when it takes place across state
borders) it is problematic to ensure that displaced people will be
sufficiently protected. This is, however, mainly connected to the
82. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on the Principle of NonRefoulement
(Nov.
1997),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html
[http://perma.cc/6TAH-L9MH].
83. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 35.
84. D v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, ¶ 52 (1997).
85. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 36; see MARGIT AMMER, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STATUS OF CLIMATE REFUGEES IN EUROPE 58–59
(2009),
http://www.migration-online.de/data/climatechangepaper0609.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NH55-RSB8].
86. Kolmannskog & Myrstad, supra note 55, at 322.
87. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1.
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fact that the regions where most of the people are and will be
displaced are poor and generally fail to provide human rights
protection to even their own citizens.
However, human rights law primarily addresses the
obligations of other states when states fail to protect human
rights of people within their territory. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
does not have a restricting jurisdictional clause. Article 2(1),
provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant .
. . .88

Consequently, economic, social, and cultural rights are
generally considered to have an extraterritorial component.89
The obligation of states to protect, respect, and fulfil these rights
is not restricted to a given state’s jurisdiction.90
Moreover, the essential role of cooperation and assistance in
facilitating the full realization of the relevant rights is further
underlined by the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 15,
22, and 23 of the ICESCR.91 The ICESCR is particularly relevant
for those who are displaced due to climate change as this will
frequently imply a violation of economic, social and cultural
rights, such as the right to housing, an adequate standard of
living, or the right to health. According to Sepúlveda, the premise
of Article 2(1) is that “some countries are not able to achieve the
full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights if those
countries in the position to assist do not actually provide them

88. ICESCR, supra note 71, art. 2(1).
89. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 95.
90. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 260–63. Furthermore, “State
Parties to the ICESCR in a position to assist are also obliged to provide this
assistance to those who are not parties to the Covenant.” Id. at 280.
91. ICESCR, supra note 71, art. 11, 15, 22, 23.
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with assistance.”92
This understanding of extraterritorial
character regarding the realization of economic, social, and
cultural rights finds further support in the General Comments
and other human rights reports and soft-law instruments.93 The
Maastricht principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is one of the
prominent developments in that regard.94 Moreover, when it
comes to climate change, the committee supervising the ICESCR
has held that this obligation entails, inter alia, the obligation to
“take steps through international cooperation and assistance,
depending on the availability of resources, to facilitate the
fulfilment of human rights in other countries, including disaster
relief, emergency assistance, and assistance to refugees and
displaced persons.”95
The extraterritorial obligations within the context of climateinduced population movement play a vital role. As demonstrated,
regions where most of climate-induced population movement
takes and will take place lack the capacity to protect and fulfil the
human rights of people within its territory. In many cases,
neighbouring states also lack this capacity. Therefore, the
assistance from those states that are in the position to assist can
significantly diminish the human rights risks associated with
migration, induced displacement and planned relocation.

92. Magdalena Sepúlveda, Obligations of ‘International Assistance and
Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 290 (2006).
93. See id. at 290–92.
94. See generally ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS (2013), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/
library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23
[http://perma.cc/TTW9-66UE].
95. GROMILOVA & J ÄGERS , supra note 1, at 95; see also U.N. Comm. Econ.,
Soc. & Cult. Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art.
11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult.
Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rights, General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art.
12), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult.
Rights, General Comment No.15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the
Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C/12/2002/11 (Sept. 25, 2015).
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While the legal basis of the extraterritorial obligations might
be acknowledged,96 the character, scope, and the extent of these
obligations are questionable.97 First, regardless of the fact that
the Committee has referred to states’ obligations of international
assistance and cooperation in various observations, comments,
and practices, there is still a great level of disagreement as to
whether the obligations underpinning the provision of Article 2
are legally binding.98 There is no legally binding document that
elaborates on the content of extraterritorial obligations. Second,
the reach of extraterritorial obligations is a key issue.99 Neither
the form of assistance nor its reach is identified. As Knox argues,
the obligation of international assistance is an extension of the
duty to fulfil, which is an open-ended obligation that imposes
positive, rather than negative, duties on states.100 Furthermore,
human rights law to a large extent remains attached to
jurisdiction.101
Although the ICESCR suggests that the
obligations extend beyond states, this understanding requires
further support.
Yet, human rights law is an important framework when it
comes to the issue of climate-induced population movement. The
main advantage is that it applies to everyone regardless of
whether the causation between climate change and population
96. Christian Courtis & Magdalena Sepúlveda, Are Extra-Territorial
Obligations Reviewable Under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR?, 27
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 54, 55–56,
http://www.henderson.uottawa.ca/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_down
load/gid,83/lang,fr/ (2009) [http://perma.cc/8DL2-MTKD]; Knox, supra note 71,
at 201–02.
97. Knox, supra note 71, at 207; Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial
Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, IN
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 41, 47–49 (FONS
COOMANS & MENNO T. KAMMINGA EDS., 2004); see MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL.,
GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
98. LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 96, at 62–63. In the debates surrounding the
drafting of the optional protocol to the ICESCR, countries such as the UK,
Canada, France, and others claimed that international cooperation and
assistance is an “important moral obligation but not a legal entitlement.”. Id. at
62 (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id. at 64.
100. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 283–84; Knox, supra note 71, at
208.
101. HUMPHREYS , supra note 74, at 56.
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movement is established. It also lays down legal obligations of
international assistance and cooperation, which is of a particular
importance for people affected by climate change.
d. Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate
Change
There is another important development within the human
rights policy field that has great added value for the issue of
climate-induced population movement. This development is the
emergence of the human rights-based approach. The human
rights-based approach has often been mentioned in relation to
climate change in climate-change negotiations and discussions.102
In a nutshell, von Doussa defined it as follows: “[A] human rightsbased approach provides a conceptual framework for climate
change policies; a framework which is normatively based on
international human rights standards and which is practically
directed to promoting and protecting human rights.”103 The
importance of the human rights-based approach to adaptation
has been emphasised by the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has called for increased state
action on adaptation and has emphasized the importance of
applying a human rights-based approach in guiding policies and
measures related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.104
According to the OHCHR, a human rights-based approach should
be integrated into any climate change adaptation or mitigation
policy.105
The added value of the human rights-based approach for
each type of adaptation strategy suggested in the Cancun
102. HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2008), http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/
content/pdf/about/media/papers/hrandclimate_change.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P7XK-EC9T]; see HUMPHREYS, supra note 74, at 56; Marc
Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political
Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 440–48 (2009); Human Rights Council,
REP. OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Climate Change & Human Rights
Report].
103. HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 102, at 12.
104. See Climate Change & Human Rights Report, supra note 102, ¶¶ 92–99.
105. See id.
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Agreement (migration, displacement, and planned relocation) is
that it allows for a focus on individuals and sensitivity towards
their problems. It allows for complementing the technical side of
adaptation strategies, and making adaptation to climate change
sensitive to human rights during each technical stage—
preparation, implementation, and evaluation of adaptation
strategies.106
3. Climate Law
Since it is climate change that induces people to move,
climate law is of central importance. The UNFCCC and its
supporting instruments form a basis for a dynamic and rapidly
evolving climate law regime.107
a. Obligations Arising from Principles of the
UNFCCC
i. No-Harm Rule
The preamble to the UNFCCC and Article 3 set out a number
of international environmental principles applicable to the
regime. Among these is the “no-harm” principle, which has also
gained the status of international customary law.108
The
preamble recalls the words of Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration and Principle 2 of its successor, the 1992 Rio
Declaration, and notes that states have:
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or

106. See Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–94.
107. Kati Kulovesi, Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship:
Two Emerging Trends, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 31, 35 (Erkki J. Hollo
et al. eds., 2012).
108. United States v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941); PHILIPPE SANDS &
JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196 (3d
ed. 2012). Another principle of international customary law, which might be
relevant is the “polluter pays principle.” This principle provides that the
“polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution.” SANDS & PEEL, supra,
at 229. Nevertheless, the “polluter pays principle” has not received a lot of
support and attention among States and in case law. Id.
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control do not cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.109

This principle allows for a claim that some states have
caused damage to other states because of their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, which have resulted in the migration of people
and, therefore, these states should also be responsible for helping
these people. When a rule of customary international law, such as
the “no-harm rule,” is breached, states can be held responsible for
the damages. 110 However, to establish the breach of this rule in
reality is highly challenging due to the hurdle of establishing
causality between the damaging activity and the damage to the
third state.111 The state where climate-induced movement takes
place would therefore have to prove, first, that the emissions of
some particular state have caused the specific climate change
impact (for instance, sea-level rise) and, second, that this
particular sea-level rise has led to the migration of people.112 To
establish this kind of causality under contemporary international
law appears highly challenging, if not impossible.113

109. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166; U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/48/14/Rev.1
(June 16, 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/151/26/Rev.1
(June 14, 1992).
110. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. “Every
internationally wrongful act of the State entails the responsibility of that State.”
Id. To establish this responsibility, the following elements must be met: (a) a
wrongful act attributable to the state, (b) a causal link between the activity and
damage, and (c) a violation of either international law or a violation of a duty of
care, which is (d) owed to the damaged State. See id.
111. STEPHEN GARDINER ET AL., CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL READINGS 84
(2010); see Richard Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and
Compensation for Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economical
Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1110–14 (2004).
112. Rebecca E. Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in
Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court Of Justice,
14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J 103, 111 (2005); see Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1,
at 247–49, for other problems in establishing causation.
113. See Tol & Verheyen, supra note 110, at 1112; see also Christina Voigt,
State Responsibility for Climate Change Damage, 77 NORDIC J. INT‘L L. 1, 21
(2008).
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ii. Precautionary principle
Another highly relevant principle is the precautionary
principle, included in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC. This principle
requires parties to:
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. 114

The principle requires proactive measures, which, in the case
of climate-induced population movement, means that there is no
need to wait for harm and establish causation. Even when it is
not possible to wholly attribute the cause of population
displacement to climate change, in the face of a lack of scientific
evidence on the impact of climate change and the link to
migration, it is necessary to take a precautionary approach. As
Hugo observes, even though discussions on the extent of climateinduced displacement often tend to exaggerate the scope of the
issue,115 it is nevertheless a fact that displacement is inevitable.
In these cases, as Hugo argues, the precautionary principle must
apply.116
This principle has been increasingly applied in courts,
especially in environmental cases.117 As Sands and Peel argue,
there is a sufficient support for an argument that the
precautionary principle reflects a principle of customary law.118

114. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170.
115. GRAEME H UGO, Lessons from Past Forced Resettlement for Climate
Change Migration, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 260, 267 (2011).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., SANDS & PEEL, supra note 108, at 223–28. In particular, the
Hague District Court has ruled that “[t]he fact that the amount of the Dutch
emissions is small compared to other countries does not affect the obligation to
take precautionary measures in view of the State’s obligation to exercise care.”
Rb.-Hague 24 June 2015, RvdW 2015, 7196 M.NT. (URGENDA FOUNDATION/THE
STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS) (NETH.), http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/
inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 [http://perma.cc/W85N-G99C].
118. SANDS & PEEL, supra note 108, at 228.
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For the issue of climate-induced population movement, the
precautionary approach has paramount importance, since it can
encourage pro-active resettlement of communities in cases where
relocation is the only option, can mobilize adaptation efforts at an
early stage, and can also foster the provision of assistance in
adaptation.
iii. Principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities
Last, but not least, the UNFCCC lays down the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities, which is the central
pillar of the climate law regime. Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC
states:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.119

In the context of climate change-induced population
movement, this principle means that those countries that have
contributed the most to climate change should take a lead in
assisting countries where climate change impacts cause
population movement to respond and to manage this movement.
b. Treaty-based obligations
Positive obligations under the climate law regime follow the
UNFCCC and its supporting instruments.120 The obligations are
differentiated among parties, in line with the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities.121

119. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169.
120. See generally Kulovesi, supra note 107.
121. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170 (“All Parties, taking into
account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances,
shall . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Besides the positive obligations of states regarding
mitigation, the UNFCCC lays down adaptation obligations, which
are relevant in the case of climate-induced population movement.
More specifically, Article 4(1)(b) requires states to
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing . . .
measures to facilitate adaptation to climate change.”122
Obligations regarding adaptation are also differentiated
among parties. Developing states must be assisted by developed
states, and their success in adaptation depends on the extent to
which this assistance is available to them.123 In particular,
Article 4(3) sets financial obligations aimed at helping developing
countries meet the agreed full costs of preparing for adaptation
and also to provide such financial resources, including for the
transfer of technology needed by the developing country Parties
to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing
measures.124 Article 4(4) goes further and provides that the
developed country Parties and other developed Parties included
in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change in meeting costs of adaptation.125 This broad obligation,
as some scholars argue, sets unlimited liability on the part of
developed countries for the costs of adaptation.126
Article 4, in general and specifically its subsections 4(3) and
4(4), is the most prominent reflection of the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and clearly establishes the
obligations of developed states. Further, it can be argued that
these obligations can be translated into the context of climate
change and population movement.
The most crucial development regarding climate change and
population movement that has taken place within climate law is
that migration, induced displacement, and planned relocation

122. Id.
123. Id. at 174.
124. Id. at 173.
125. Id.
126. See M.J. Mace, Adaptation under the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change: The International Legal Framework, in FAIRNESS IN
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 53, 64 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds., 2006).
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have been acknowledged as adaptation strategies.127 The Cancun
Agreement has invited the Parties to enhance understanding and
cooperation with regard to migration, induced displacement, and
planned relocation as adaptation strategies.128 It has also
encouraged least-developed countries to develop National
Adaptation Plans (NAPs).129 These plans can specify measures
that can “facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change”130
through, for instance, strategies for the planned relocation of
people. Although the Cancun Adaptation Framework is a
voluntary agreement that does not have binding power over its
parties,131 it allows for specifying the form of assistance
suggested by Article 4 of the UNFCCC.
Ensuring compliance with the provisions of Article 4 of the
UNFCCC and paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Agreement is
problematic in reality.132
First of all, under Article 4(3),
developed countries are expected to provide funding to developing
countries to meet the “agreed full costs” and “agreed full
incremental costs” of adaptation.133 This means the costs agreed
upon between developing countries and the UNFCCC’s financial
mechanism, which is represented by the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF).134 Reaching agreement on projects that involve
the relocation of people will, in reality, become problematic, since,
besides the issue of financing, sensitive political issues (such as
who will accommodate migrants) will have to be resolved. Second,
developing countries are only eligible to receive finances that
cover “incremental costs.”135 The UNFCCC does not specify what
127. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14.
128. Id.
129. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties
on its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsawfrom 11 to 23 November 2013, art. 15,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014), http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf [http://perma.cc/FA74-D4QK].
130. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170.
131. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 80(a); Rowena Maguire, Foundations
of International Climate Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE LAW, SUPRA NOTE 106, AT 83, 107; MCADAM, supra note 42, at
232.
132. See RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 92–93 (2005).
133. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173.
134. Mace, supra note 126, at 63.
135. See UNFCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173.
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“incremental costs” entail.136 Mace argues that “incremental
costs” refers to the cost in addition to actions necessary to address
a national need and refers to the additional costs of more
expensive environmental projects.137 Arguably, the costs of
actions that support aims other than purely the need to address
climate change impacts, or that would be implemented anyway
with funding from other sources, are, in a strict sense, not
incremental.138 This could be an obstacle in the context of
climate-induced movement, which, as has been noted, is difficult
to link purely with climate change impacts and arguably falls
under funding and assistance from other sources, such as human
rights frameworks.
Article 4(4) offers some opportunities, since it establishes
unlimited liability on the part of the developed country Parties to
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.139 Though the
definition of adaptation measures is lacking under the UNFCCC,
with the new Cancun Agreement in place, it can be concluded
that population movement constitutes a form of adaptation
strategy and therefore assistance should be provided in managing
this migration, displacement, or planned relocation.
Yet, the way in which Article 4(3) and 4(4) are formulated,
using the terms “shall” and “assist” makes clear that there is no
straight obligation for Annex II countries to bear the full costs of
adaptation in all developing countries.140 Developed countries
are only required to endeavour to assist developing countries that
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate

136. Susanne Olbrisch et al., Estimates of Incremental Investment for and Cost
of Mitigation Measures in Developing Countries 11 CLIMATE POL’Y 970, 971
(2011).
137. Mace, supra note 126, at 66.
138. VERHEYEN, supra note 132, at 97; see also MARCO GRASSO, JUSTICE IN
FUNDING ADAPTATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 75
(2010).
139. See UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173; Mace, supra note
126, at 64.
140. See UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173.
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change in meeting the cost of adaptation.141
This leaves
developed states with a lot of room to manoeuvre.142 Even though
the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in
2010 made a positive contribution towards framing the issue of
climate-induced movement and translated it into the obligations
of states,143 it is still questionable to what extent this obligation
is enforceable. The next session of the parties (COP 21) is
expected to take place in December 2015 in Paris.144 The Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
(ADP) aims to reach an outcome document with legal force
applicable to all Parties in order for it to be adopted at the COP
21.145 The current proposal includes the commitment for the
developed states to “assist in providing organized migration and
planned relocation” which has taken place due to climate
change.146 Should this provision gain legal force, the debate on
climate-induced population movement will be greatly changed.
However, whether this proposal will be accepted by the COP 21
remains to be seen.
4. Other Frameworks
There are several other relevant instruments that can be
discussed in relation to the issue of climate-induced population
movement. As has been shown, in some cases climate change
effects can lead to a conflict.147 In these cases, humanitarian law
becomes
relevant
to
climate-induced
movement.148
Humanitarian law, as is the case for human rights law, applies
141. RENÉ LEFEBER , Climate Change and State Responsibility, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 322 (Rosemary Rayfuse &
Shirley V. Scott eds., 2012).
142. See Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 268–70.
143. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14.
144. See Nations Unies: Conférence sur les Changements Climatiques 2015,
UNCCC, http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/ [https://perma.cc/PZ57-8G7F]..
145. See generally Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, supra note 5.
146. Id. at 33.
147. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
148. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 17(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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equally to all civilians affected by conflict and provides basic
protection for those displaced during conflict.149 It is, however,
ignorant to the reasons underlying the conflict and resulting
displacement and provides no specific relief for people affected by
climate change.150 As Kälin and Schrepfer skeptically note, the
only way in which humanitarian law applies to the situation of
movement due to climate change-induced conflict is when the
country of refuge is a party to the conflict; otherwise,
humanitarian law has no practical relevance in the protection of
persons moving across borders.151
Since there is a lot of speculation with regard to the “sinking
islands” and disappearance of entire states, a question that is
also discussed by academics and politicians is whether climate
change can create a precedent of statelessness.152 However, it is
mostly agreed that it is not likely that people from sinking
islands will become stateless in a legal sense and will fall under
protection of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless People.153 In that regard, Crawford concludes that
there is “a strong presumption against the extinction of states.”154
Even when territory as one of the elements of statehood
disappears, it most likely will not lead to de jure statelessness,
but rather de facto statelessness.155 The legal definition of
“statelessness”, as McAdam argues, was meant “to apply only to
de jure statelessness—premised on the denial of nationality
through the operation of the law of a particular state,” and it does
not extend to de facto stateless.156

149. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 148.
150. Ben Saul & Jane McAdam, An Insecure Climate for Human Security?
Climate-Induced Displacement and International Law 15 (Sydney Ctr. for Int’l
L., Working Paper No. 4, 2008).
151. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 27–28.
152. See id. at 37–40; J ANE MCADAM , ‘Disappearing States,’ Statelessness and
the Boundaries of International Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE & DISPLACEMENT:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 105, 105–30 [hereinafter
Disappearing States].
153. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954,
360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter Stateless Persons Convention].
154. J AMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 715
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2006).
155. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 38.
156. Disappearing States, supra note 152, at 119.
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III. IDENTIFYING PRIORITIES FOR ACTIONS AND
INTEGRATING OPPORTUNITIES
This complex state of play demonstrates that conceptualizing
the issue under one existing legal framework may not be possible
and also not preferable. The main priorities for policy and action
when it comes to climate-induced population movement are
multifaceted and require an integrated approach and support of
different legal tools and actors. Drawing upon the empirical and
legal state-of-the-art research presented above, and the latest
initiatives proposed by academics and policy-makers, it is possible
to identify several priorities to be addressed in the context of
population movement induced by climate change.157 While this
list of priorities is not exhaustive, these are the most immediate
tasks to be addressed by any future approach:
 Human rights of people induced to move by climate
change are at risk and have to be protected;
 There is a need for a pre-emptive approach
(adaptation strategies including those that prevent
people from migrating, but also migration as an
adaptation strategy, even in some cases as an end to
adaptation);
 While primarily responsibility lies with the affected
state, international assistance is vital, since the
affected states will in many cases lack the capacity to
adapt.
 There is a need for a regional-sensitive approach,
since the problems associated with climate-induced
movement, and the character of these movements,
vary considerably depending on the region.
As has been shown in Section 2.5, no legal framework can
simultaneously address all these priorities. However, as this
article will further demonstrate, there is an approach that allows
157. See Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 58–62; The Nansen Initiative,
Cross-Border Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: A
Protection Agenda, 35–39 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.nanseninitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/DRAFT-Nansen-Initiative-Protection-Agenda-forConsultation-08042015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGF2-KF7R]; Preparing for a
Warmer World, supra note 4; Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1186–1201.
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for integrating the opportunities offered by different fragments of
the legal system. This suggested approach is the adaptation
approach, which originated in the Cancun Adaptation
Framework. As noted above, for the purpose of this article, the
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement is
defined as a proactive approach in which migration,
displacement, and planned relocation are used as adaptation
measures that allow people to adjust to a changing climate
(through moving from places at risk).158 The benefits of the
adaptation approach, and its potential in integrating the
opportunities offered by various legal frameworks, are analyzed
further.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE ADAPTATION APPROACH
A. A change of perspective
First of all, the adaptation approach allows for drawing a line
between refugees and people moving in response to climate
change. It allows for viewing mobility as positive rather than as a
problematic trend. It gives opportunities for vulnerable
populations and frees people from the “refugee label” and the way
they are treated and perceived. Rather than being victims of a
situation, it grants the potential for adjusting to the new
situation “with dignity”.159
It also allows for viewing the
government of affected state as an ally in the process of
adaptation, rather than the persecutor. States threatened by
climate change are already showing an understanding of the
importance of taking efforts to prepare for migration and enable
it, so that it can indeed constitute adaptation and lead to a winwin situation for sending and receiving areas.160

158. See supra Part I(A).
159. See Pacific Islanders Reject “Climate Refugee” Status, Want to “Migrate
with Dignity,” SIDS Conference Hears, AUSTL . B ROAD. CORP . (Sept. 5, 2014
10:52 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-05/pacific-islanders-reject-callsfor-27climate-refugee27-status/5723078
[http://perma.cc/3SRE-RMQ5].
The
most prominent example is the Pacific state Kiribati, where the government
actively lobbies on the international level to ensure “migrat[ion] with dignity”
for its citizens. See id.
160. Id.
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However, “removing the stigma surrounding migration will
not make climate change-induced population movement any less
complex.”161 Ensuring that migration is adaptation rather than a
failure to adapt162 will require careful supervision of the process
and flexibility on the part of the adaptation approach.

B. Flexibility and Potential to Address the Risks
Associated with Different Types of Mobility
Through the adaptation approach different types of mobility
can be addressed. The Cancun Agreement acknowledged that
population movement in response to climate change can take
three forms: migration, displacement, and planned relocation.163
Each one of these forms addresses movement of a different nature
(forced, voluntary), length (temporary, permanent), and distance
(internal, cross-border). When these different forms are
approached from the adaptation perspective, movement induced
by climate change can be a means to adaptation (such as in the
case with migration and temporary displacement), but also can be
the end of adaptation (in cases with permanent displacement and
planned relocation).
This flexibility of the adaptation approach responds to the
complex nature of movement induced by climate change and
contributes to conceptualization of the issue, without a need to
create a single definition or identify a single legal instrument
applicable to the issue. It also allows for identifying the most
crucial components for addressing each type of mobility.
The Cancun Agreement acknowledged the potential of each
type of mobility, regardless of their different nature, to have a
positive influence on the capacity of communities to adapt to
climate change.164 This potential varies for each type of mobility.
161. Lauren Nishimura, Climate Change Migrants: Impediments to a
Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate
Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 107, 130 (2015)
[hereinafter Climate Change Migrants].
162. Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance
Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVtL. CHANGE 402, 411–12 (2010).
163. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14(f).
164. See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 12–15; see also Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 20.
See generally GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 20; U.N. Secretary-General,

35

GROMILOVA_FINAL

140

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

5/3/2016 5:20 PM

[Vol. 33

In some cases it can improve the economic situation of migrants
and their families, helping them to increase their resilience to
climate change and allowing people to stay longer, while in other
cases the best outcome is that most human rights risks are
avoided.165
Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge that population
movement as an adaptation strategy has its limits.166 For each
type of mobility, there are distinctive risks and concerns. As
Barnett and Webber argue, for instance, “labour migration is the
best way to use the power of migration to promote adaptation to
climate change,”167 whereas displacement is more problematic as
there are many immediate humanitarian needs to be satisfied.168
Planned relocation, or, as it is also called, community
resettlement, is the adaptation strategy that entails most
risks.169 Nevertheless, the adaptation approach can be sensitive
to these risks.
Most of the risks, particularly when it comes to planned
relocation and displacement, arise from the human rights
perspective.170 As has been shown above, the human rights
dimension
of
mitigation
and
adaptation
policies
is
171
acknowledged.
Furthermore, the warning has been made that
even when the relevant law refers explicitly to human rights,
there is still a danger that mitigation and adaptation policies may
themselves undermine human rights.172
The adaptation
framework, since it has recognized these humanitarian risks, is
International Migration and Development, U.N. Doc A/69/207 (July 30, 2014);
W ORLD B ANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION (2006); W ARNER ET AL ., supra note 26; Barnett &
Webber, supra note 13.
165. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; Barnett & Webber, supra note 13, at
23–29 (warning that community resettlement “rarely leads to positive
outcome”).
166. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 20. However, there is a way to
minimize the risks with resettlement and planned relocation. See Revisiting
Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–95.
167. Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 42.
168. Id. at 48.
169. Id. at 43.
170. See Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; Revisiting Planned Relocation,
supra note 1, at 81.
171. See supra Part II(E)(2).
172. Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 49–50.
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more sensitive to human rights than the UNFCCC itself, and can
address them.
As identified above, the adaptation framework strongly relies
on the human-rights based approach, which essentially reaffirms
that the process of climate change decision-making does integrate
human rights issues and places a human’s well-being at the core
of a particular adaptation strategy.173 This means that the
adaptation approach has potential to make migration, planned
relocation, and, to some extent, resettlement a win-win situation
for sending and receiving areas,174 while, at the same time,
ensuring that the human rights of individuals are acknowledged
and prioritized throughout the whole process of decision-making,
implementation, and evaluation of adaptation strategies.175
C. Tools of the “Adaptation Approach” and Institutional
Capacity
Population movement as an adaptation strategy relies on the
support of different legal frameworks and therefore can make use
of the tools available under them. The fact that the Cancun
Agreement is developed under the UNFCCC makes the tools of
climate law relevant. The fact that the humanitarian
consequences of climate change have been acknowledged makes
tools available under human rights law, such as the human
rights-based approach discussed above. Last, but not least, since
adaptation takes the form of migration, migration law is relevant.
These relevant frameworks are supported by a number of
institutions, which further strengthens the adaptation approach.
1. Climate Law Tools and Institutions
a. Tools
One of the central tools for adaptation within the UNFCCC is
National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs). NAPAs
provide an opportunity for the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)
to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and
173. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 88–95.
174. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1.
175. See Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–95.
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immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change.176
For the LDCs, NAPAs are the first step towards financing and
implementation of adaptation measures.177
The Cancun
Adaptation Framework reemphasized the obligation of
adaptation under Article 4(1)(b) of the UNFCCC, and invited
Parties to cooperate regarding specific actions on the national,
regional, and international levels when it comes to the issue of
population movement due to climate change.178 It has also
suggested for the first time that migration, displacement, and
planned relocation can become part of National Adaptation Plans
(NAPs).179 NAPs are different from NAPAs. The NAP process,
established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, enables
Parties to formulate NAPs as a means of identifying medium- and
long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing
strategies and programmes to address those needs. It builds upon
the NAPA process, but, while the NAPA process was designed to
produce one national adaptation programme of action, the NAP
process has been designed to create a comprehensive system
through which countries can integrate climate change adaptation
into national planning and produce national adaptation plans on
an ongoing basis.180 Ultimately, NAPs allow for a more coherent
and comprehensive country-owned, and country-driven, process of
adaptation.181 Apart from LDCs, developing-country Parties are
also encouraged to begin preparation of their NAP process.182

176. National Adaptation Programmes of Action, UNFCCC (2014),
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_programmes_of_a
ction/items/7567.php [http://perma.cc/8VB2-57ME].
177. Gromilova & Jägers, supra note 1, at 19.
178. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶¶ 13–14.
179. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 50.
180. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, National Adaptation
Plans: Technical Guidelines for the National Adaptation Process, at 15 (Dec.
2012),
http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/application/pdf/
naptechguidelines_eng_high__res.pdf [http://perma.cc/GFX9-JS25] [hereinafter
National Adaptation Plans].
181. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, The National
Adaptation Plan Process: A Brief Overview, at 8 (Dec. 2012), http://unfccc.int/
files/adaptation/application/pdf/nap_overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/H464-DCKT].
182. Non-LDC Info - National Adaptation Plans, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/
adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_plans/items/7596.php
[http://perma.cc/5PPA-2QLN] (last updated Jan. 7, 2014).
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The adaptation approach, therefore, more than ever, allows
for a bottom-up approach, where the plan is developed on the
national level but can at the same time be financially supported
and coordinated on the international level. In that regard, the
COP 16 created an Adaptation Committee and a Subsidiary Body
for Implementation (SBI), and established a new Green Climate
Fund, through which the new multilateral funding for adaptation
should flow. 183
So far, the acknowledgement of migration as a component of
adaptation in NAPAs is, however, limited. The “Migration RPC’s
Study”, an empirical study and comprehensive analysis of the
forty-five NAPAs submitted to the UNFCCC by the end of 2010,
reveals that migration is mainly recognized in NAPAs not as a
coping strategy but rather as a negative side-effect of climate
change.184 Of the forty-five NAPAs reviewed, only fourteen
NAPAs proposed priority projects that involve the resettlement of
communities or addressing issues of displacement, while thirteen
NAPAs included priority projects that aim to limit rural outmigration (especially rural-urban exodus), nine NAPAs included
priority projects related to limiting transhumant migration, and
one NAPA incorporated conflict-driven migration into its priority
projects which focuses on resolution of the latter.185 Therefore, so
far migration is not viewed as a means to adaptation, but rather
as an ad hoc reaction to the impacts of climate change. When it
comes to NAPs, the data and the way they develop are still
lacking.186
The fact that the majority of NAPAs still have a negative
perception of migration on the national level runs counter to the
general ambition set on the international level to use migration
as an adaptation strategy that can boost development and
contribute to resilience. Assistance in promoting and explaining
the benefits of migration as an adaptation strategy is therefore

183. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶¶ 102–09.
184. Jon Sward & Samuel Codjoe, Human Mobility and Climate Change
Adaptation Policy: a Review of Migration in National Adaptation Programmes of
Action (NAPAs) 13 (Res. Programme Consortium, Working Paper No. 6, 2012).
185. Id. at 21–22.
186. See generally National Adaptation Plans, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/
adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_plans/items/6057.php
[http://perma.cc/JM3N-LLGQ] (last updated Nov. 2, 2015).
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vital. Although countries develop their NAPAs and NAPs
themselves, they can also receive assistance from external actors.
As set out by the UNFCCC, each country selects a Global
Environmental Facility agency to provide technical assistance in
planning and implementation of its NAPA.187 Additionally, the
Least Developed Country Expert Group (LEG) is available to
provide technical support and advice.188 The LEG will also
provide technical guidance and support to the NAP process.189
Therefore, a better understanding by these actors of the benefits
and potential of migration as an adaptation strategy can help to
change the understanding of migration in NAPAs and future
NAPs and optimize the potential of migration.
Furthermore, the “Migration RPC’s Study” reveals that even
when NAPAs do refer to migration, they typically concern
internal migration, as opposed to international migratory
flows.190 This should also be addressed and further integrated,
since cross-border movements are inevitable in some regions
(including permanent relocation in the case of small island
states). This challenges the current understanding of NAPAs and
NAPs, which is limited to the national level, and may require
adjustments. Such possible adjustment could be the inclusions in
NAPAs and NAPs of provisions that stimulate and require the
development of bilateral migration or planned relocation
agreements between states.
b. Institutional support
The Cancun Agreement, developed within the UNFCCC
context, brings the issue of climate-induced population movement
within the forum that has the potential to address it. The
UNFCCC has a vast membership and a lot of developing
countries and least-developed countries, which are acknowledged
hot-spots of climate-induced population movement, such as
Bangladesh, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and many of the affected African

187.
188.
189.
190.

Sward & Codjoe, supra note 184, at 8.
Id. at 9.
National Adaptation Plans, supra note 180, at 7.
Sward & Codjoe, supra note 184, at 7.
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states.191 Furthermore, the UNFCCC regime is built upon the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which
makes it attractive for these vulnerable states to rely on the
support of this regime.
The institutional regime under the UNFCCC is already
established, with several mechanisms and funds relevant to
adaptation. Among the mechanisms are: the Adaptation
Committee established at COP 16,192 the Nairobi work
programme (NWP) established at COP 12,193 the Subsidiary Body
for Implementation (SBI) established at COP 1,194 and the
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
associated with Climate Change Impacts established at the COP
19.195
There are four funds relevant to adaptation under the
UNFCCC: the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the
Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and
the Green Climate Fund. Though these funds have often been
criticized for their inadequacy,196 as McAnaney notes, most states
still participate in the UNFCCC funding mechanisms.197
In that regard, the advantage of bringing the issue of
climate-induced population movement under the UNFCCC
adaptation agenda is that besides the interest in the regime by
the developing countries, many developed states also remain

191. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/
essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php
[http://perma.cc/B8FP-SAXH].
192. Adaptation Committee, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/bodies/adaptation_
committee/body/6968.php [http://perma.cc/T6JY-H7HN].
193. FOCUS: Adaptation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/items/
6999.php [http://perma.cc/6MSJ-RLL6].
194. See Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6406.php [https://perma.cc/KL77-BK5W].
195. See Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate
Change Impacts in Developing Countries Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse
Effects of Climate Change, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/
loss_and_damage/items/6056.php [http://perma.cc/E7Y8-2DCH].
196. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 77. According to Climate
Funds Update, there is USD 1.22 billion available to support all projects and
programmes, while the World Bank Group estimated in 2010 that “the costs of
adaptation to climate change in developing countries are . . . in the range of
USD 75 to USD 100 billion a year between 2010 and 2050.” Id.
197. Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1207.
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supportive of the regime.198 Addressing population movement in
response to climate change through the established adaptation
regime is probably also politically feasible.199 Although it is not
likely that states will agree on binding obligations, the parties to
the UNFCCC have agreed on adaptation goals and
commitments.200 As statistics show, developed states are willing
to provide aid.201 Furthermore, the potential of strengthening
existing funds, so that they can extend to migration as an
adaptation strategy, seems more realistic than the creation of
entirely new funds.
2. Human Rights Law Tools and Institutions
a. Tools
The emergence of the human rights-based approach to
climate change, as discussed above in Section 2.5.2 and Section 3,
is a significant development, which reaffirms that the process of
climate change decision-making does integrate human rights
issues and places a human’s well-being at the core of a particular
adaptation strategy. In particular, the human rights-based
approach can ensure that during the process of planning,
implementation, and evaluation of migration, displacement, or
planned relocation as adaptation strategies, the human rights of
the people involved are prioritized and secured.
b. Institutional support
As previously stated, the Cancun Agreement has confirmed
the link between human rights law and climate law. Human
rights institutions and treaty bodies therefore play an important
role when it comes to ensuring that adaptation to climate change
takes human rights into account. The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and, in particular,
198. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 262.
199. Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1207.
200. See, e.g., Cancun Agreements, supra note 6.
201. Contributor Countries, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE,
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/global-trends/donor-countries
[http://perma.cc/J7MU-A3Z9] (depicting relative sizes of contributions by
country).
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the Human Rights Council, have acknowledged the importance of
the link, especially when it comes to adaptation.202 Therefore,
with the help of the committees and agencies available under the
human rights regime,203 the “rights-based approach” to climate
change actions, including adaptation strategies, can be
implemented.
There are a number of human rights supervisory bodies that
have been tasked with overseeing compliance with human rights
treaties. Such supervisory bodies as the Human Rights
Committee (CCPR); the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR); the Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC); and the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) can
play a crucial role in monitoring human rights violations related
to climate-induced population movement and in some cases can
consider individual complaints.204
In addition, although people induced to move by climate
change do not fall under the mandate of the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNHCR
nevertheless plays an important role. First of all, the UNHCR has
been constantly bringing attention to the issue of climate-induced
migration and to the existing legal gap in that regard.205 Second,
the UNHCR has experience in creating and lobbing for relevant
instruments, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement,206 which can considerably support an adaptation
framework.207
Furthermore, the expertise of the High
Commissioner in view of emergencies, as well as its legal and

202. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 81.
203. See Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Climate Change and Human
Rights: A Rough Guide, at 9–11 (2008).
204. See Jane Connors & Markus Schmidt, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 359, 377–87 (Moeckli, et al. eds., 2010).
205. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 53.
206. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Representative of the
Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Comm’n
Resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
207. Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses,
Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement (Feb. 22–26,
2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9f22b32.html [http://perma.cc/
8CBJ-S62G] [hereinafter Summary of Deliberations]; see also Kälin & Schrepfer,
supra note 8, at 53.
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technical expertise in dealing with refugee crisis, will be
important.208
Last, but not least, the UNHCR is supporting some of the
most recent and also most promising soft-law initiatives. Since
paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Agreement did not suggest how
climate-induced population movement should be addressed, the
“UNHCR took the initiative to bring together a group of experts .
. . to discuss options for addressing” the issue.209 This group of
experts is referred to as the roundtable of experts on climate
change and displacement, and was organized by the UNHCR in
2011.210 It highlighted the need for a global guiding framework
for external displacement not covered by the current refugee
regime.211 This roundtable informed the Nansen Conference on
Climate Change and Displacement, and resulted in the Nansen
Principles.212 Principle 9 stressed the need for a more coherent
international approach “to meet the protection needs of people
displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disaster” and
proposed that “states, working in conjunction with UNHCR and
other relevant stakeholders, could develop a guiding framework
or instruments in this regard.”213 It has also led to the Nansen
initiative, launched by Norway and Switzerland in October
2012.214
The Nansen Initiative is a bottom-up, state-led
consultative process with multi-stakeholder involvement, and has
an overall goal of building consensus among states on key
principles and elements to protect people displaced across borders
in the context of disasters caused by natural hazards, including
those linked to climate change.215 Though the Nansen Initiative
is not an attempt to suggest a legal framework and the Nansen
Principles are not a soft-law instrument,216 it certainly improves
208. Preparing for a Warmer World, supra note 4, at 79.
209. Walter Kälin, From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative, 41
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 48, 49 (2012).
210. Summary of Deliberations, supra note 207, at 1.
211. Id.
212. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE C OUNCIL , The Nansen Conference: Climate Change
and Displacement in the 21st Century, AT 5, (June 5–7, 2011).
213. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 55.
214. About us, THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, http://www.nanseninitiative.org/
secretariat/ [http://perma.cc/9R4N-FWLA].
215. Kälin, supra note 209, at 49.
216. Id.
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understanding of the issue and can further support the
adaptation approach initiated by the UNFCCC. The UNHCR,
which plays an active role in Nansen Initiative,217 can therefore
further positively influence the development of understanding
and further promoting the importance of the issue in the
international arena.
3. Migration Law Tools and Institutions
a. Tools
The adaptation approach reveals the links between
adaptation policies and migration policies. Migration policies can
be a tool of the adaptation approach.218 Examples of migration
schemes in the Pacific, namely New Zealand’s Recognized
Seasonal Employer Scheme (RSE) and Australia’s Seasonal
Worker Program (SWP), demonstrate that migration schemes can
be an effective tool in boosting adaptation in developing countries,
allowing them to increase resilience and development.219 Such
schemes can be essential tools for managing different types of
mobility as a form of adaptation.
Temporary (seasonal) labour migration schemes, for instance,
can be successful tools when it comes to migration as a form of
adaptation to climate change.220 Remittances sent back home, in
addition to the knowledge and technologies gained during
seasonal migration, contribute to the improvement of the
economic situation, giving opportunities to implement adaptation
measures and to increase the resilience of households.221 When it
comes to displacement, specific migration schemes that offer
immediate temporary labour opportunities for displaced people
can have the same positive impact, allowing people to restore
their homes and livelihoods and to return to their country

217. Id.
218. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; see also PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12,
at 24.
219. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., IPCC 2007, supra note 3, at 373, 728; Neil Adger et al.,
Migration, Remittances, Livelihood Trajectories, and Social Resilience, 31 J.
HUMAN ENV’T 358, 359 (2002); Barnett & Webber, supra note 11, at 22.
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faster.222 When migration is an end to adaptation and takes a
form of planned relocation/resettlement, specific labour schemes
for relocated people can also ensure that planned relocation is
successful, since people are given the economic basis for a fresh
start.
There are numerous conditions required for labour schemes
to contribute positively to adaptation.223 There should be a
mechanism to prioritize hiring people from countries affected by
climate change and a mechanism that can ensure that the gains
of participation in labour programmes are actually going into
climate change adaptation measures. Furthermore, migration
schemes should support existing patterns of migration, so that
people migrate to places where there is a cultural or historical
connection (such as language or already established communities
of migrants).
b. Institutional support
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) are other institutions
that are relevant and that can further strengthen the adaptation
approach to climate-induced displacement. As has been already
identified, migration, particularly labour migration, can
constitute a form of adaptation that benefits all parties involved.
IOM might not be a suitable body to protect people induced to
move due to climate change,224 but it can facilitate international
cooperation on migration and further promote the understanding
of migration as an adaptation strategy. As McAdam has noted,
IOM is already trying to take an agenda-setting role on the
issue.225 Piguet quotes IOM’s statement that “international
community is, in fact, ignoring labour mobility as a coping

222. See Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 48.
223. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1.
224. MCADAM, supra note 44, at 229.
225. Id. at 229–30. See generally Int’l Org. for Migration, IOM Outlook on
Migration, Environment and Climate Change (2014) [hereinafter IOM Outlook
on Migration]; Int’l Org. for Migration, Compendium of IOM's Activities in
Migration, Climate Change and the Environment (2009); Int’l Org. for Migration,
Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence (2009).
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strategy for climate stress.”226 In fact, in its latest report, IOM
Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change, the
IOM pronounces its devotion to advocate for the capacity of
migration to be an adaptation strategy through “continu[ing] its
advocacy efforts together with its partners on the inclusion of
human mobility within the post-Kyoto agreement,” raising
awareness and understanding of the positive ways mobility can
contribute to climate change adaptation, and ensuring that
adequate funding is made available.227
ILO is playing an increasingly important role in enhancing
the capacity of states affected by climate change to maximize the
benefits of migration.228
The ILO’s expertise will also be
extremely important when it comes to promoting a human rightsbased approach to migration as an adaptation strategy, since ILO
generally aims to promote rights at work, encourage decent
employment opportunities, enhance social protection, and
strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.229 Furthermore, the
UNFCCC and the ILO are committed to strengthening their
collaboration and mobilization of constituents in support of an
ambitious and successful global climate change agreement.230
D. Towards an Integrative Approach
Last, but not least, the adaptation approach allows for
integrating the opportunities offered by the frameworks identified
above and for building a mutually supportive system of tools and
institutions that can address the main priorities identified in the
context of climate-induced population movement.
226. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 24; Int’l Org. for Migration, World
Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global
Economy, at 399 (2008).
227. IOM Outlook on Migration, supra note 224, at 66–69.
228. See Enhancing the Capacity of Pacific Island Countries to Address the
Impacts of Climate Change on Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_226212/lang-en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/V8A5-U7W2].
229. Mission and Objectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/
about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/48PXUARQ].
230. Climate Change, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/
green-jobs/news/WCMS_302556/lang--en/index.htm
[http://perma.cc/EM2B84W9].
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1. The first priority identified is the importance of
protecting the human rights of people during
migration, displacement, or planned relocation due
to climate change.
Technical management of adaptation strategies (such as the
drafting of plans and their implementation and evaluation) takes
place under the UNFCCC agenda. As has been demonstrated, the
UNFCCC has institutions and actors with sufficient expertise to
carry this out. Treating population movement in response to
climate change as an adaptation strategy also allows for
complementing the technical expertise of the UNFCCC with the
expertise accumulated under the human rights framework.
Policy-makers have acknowledged the importance of applying the
human rights-based approach to adaptation. The human rightsbased approach helps to focus on how to ensure that human
rights are taken into account during the whole process of
migration, displacement, and planned relocation. The human
rights-based approach can be integrated into the technical
process of decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of
adaptation
strategies,
such
as
during
preparation,
implementation, and evaluation of NAPAs and NAPs.
2. The second priority identified is the need for a preemptive approach.
In this regard, the precautionary principle established under
the UNFCCC is central. As identified above, population
movement can be both a means and an end to adaptation. When
migration or displacement is a means to adaptation, it can be
used to increase the resilience of places affected by climate
change, to cease a stress on the environment, or to contribute to
adaptation programmes through remittances. For example, this
can be done through developing migration schemes and/or
incorporating plans for displacement within NAPAs and NAPs.
The precautionary principle is also relevant when movement
is an end to adaptation (planned relocation as an adaptation
strategy). The precautionary principle can ensure that even when
there is not enough scientific certainty about the time a certain
area will be dramatically affected by climate change, actions must
be taken to relocate people. The human rights-based approach
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can greatly compliment planned relocation as an adaptation
strategy, since it can make sure that relocation is sensitive to the
human rights risks for relocated people and people from receiving
areas.
3. The third priority is the availability of
international assistance.
As has been demonstrated, both human rights law and
climate law require developed states to provide assistance to
developing states. The extent and character of this assistance,
however, is not clear. Acknowledgement of migration,
displacement, and planned relocation as climate change
adaptation strategies requires recognition of the humanitarian
consequences of climate change. This allows for a different angle
of looking at the obligations regarding assistance and cooperation
in adaptation. Accordingly, the norms of climate law can be seen
and interpreted in conjunction with human rights norms.231 One
the one hand, the focus on individuals and their human rights
lays down the baseline against which to measure the extent and
scope of assistance required in terms of adaptation under Article
4 of the UNFCCC. This means that while it is hard to establish
which adaptation measures are required for individuals in the
context of climate law alone (since the UNFCCC process is
technical and scientist-led), this question gets more clarity when
human rights concerns are involved. People in affected areas
should get assistance in adaptation, at least to an extent that the
negative human rights implications are diminished or prevented.
On the other hand, when the matter of assistance is approached
from the climate law perspective, the precautionary principle
comes forward. Therefore, there is no need to wait for human
rights violations when there are clear environmental concerns.
This strengthens a human rights duty to fulfill (through
international assistance and cooperation), since it can be claimed
that the duty to fulfill arises where there are serious concerns
(regardless of scientific uncertainty) that a country requires
adaptation to climate change through migration, displacement, or
planned relocation.

231. Limon, supra note 102, at 452.
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Another advantage of looking at the matter of international
assistance from the adaptation perspective is that the adaptation
approach helps to clarify not only when the rights should be
fulfilled (through proactive provision of assistance in adaptation),
but also who should provide this assistance. The principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities established in climate
law can strengthen the principle of international assistance
under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. While there is a lot of
scepticism about the extraterritoriality of human rights
obligations, climate law highlights that global issues cannot be
approached from a traditional territorial focus, but require
cooperation. As Limon suggests, the principle of common but
differentiated can reshape international human rights law and
make it more responsive to the inequalities of the globalized
world.232 This shows that the adaptation approach allows for use
of human rights law and climate law as mutually supportive
frameworks and can help to achieve more than each of these
domains of law could achieve alone.
4. The fourth priority is a need for a regionally
sensitive approach
NAPAs and NAPs are the most relevant instruments in that
regard, since they are the most prominent bottom-up tools when
it comes to adaptation. Furthermore, as has been shown above,
migration schemes can also be tools that support adaptation at
the regional level. When these schemes are appropriately
developed, they will allow people to migrate within “comfortable”
routes and make migration, displacement, or planned relocation a
more successful story from the human rights perspective.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of climate-induced population movement is greatly
important, with many risks involved and many questions
regarding obligations, protection, and responsibilities remaining
unanswered. The complex nature of the issue continuously
challenges policy-makers and law-makers. International law

232. Id. at 474–75.
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remains fragmented and does not offer a clear way to
conceptualize the issue.
While, at the moment, international law remains limited in
its capacity to address the issue of climate-induced population
movement, there are also developments that do have potential.
As this article has demonstrated, the fact that the Cancun
Adaptation
Agreement
has
acknowledged
migration,
displacement, and planned relocation as adaptation strategies is
a positive development. It was argued that this step in legislation
allows for developing an adaptation approach, which has
numerous benefits in effectively addressing priorities central for
climate-induced population movement. The legal analysis also
showed that this approach allows the integration of the
opportunities offered by distinct legal frameworks. Furthermore,
this shows the interlinkages within the fragmented international
law.
In particular, the adaptation approach has the following
strengths: it allows for addressing the issue of climate-induced
population movement in a proactive way (since it relies on the
precautionary principle); it can ensure that the human rights of
people involved are at the core of planning, implementation, and
evaluation of adaptation strategies (through the human rightsbased approach); it suggests tools that can make migration,
displacement, and planned relocation a more successful process
(through specifically developed migration schemes and programs,
NAPAs and NAPs); and it emphasises the obligations of
developed countries (those who have contributed the most to
climate change) to provide assistance in adaptation (this
assistance follows from both human rights and climate law
frameworks).
An understanding of the benefits of treating climate-induced
population movements as a matter of adaptation must be further
strengthened and integrated into the international agenda.
Currently, the draft proposal that will be discussed at the COP 21
in December 2015 in Paris includes the commitment for the
developed states to “assist in providing organized migration and
planned relocation” due to climate change.233 This provision
appears under the loss and damage framework and envisages
233. Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, supra note 5, at 33.
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assistance in response to loss and damage occurred due to
extreme events and slow-onset climate events. However, when it
comes to adaptation to climate change, migration, displacement,
and planned relocation are not included in the proposal. Although
acceptance of the provision under the loss and damage framework
will no doubt make a great contribution to the climate-induced
migration debate, this will not support an adaptation approach.
The important priorities identified for addressing the issue of
climate-induced population movement include not only reactive
measures (when loss and damage have already occurred). As has
been shown, the pro-active approach is vital for both successful
adaptation and effective protection of human rights. Therefore, it
is crucial when looking at migration, displacement, and planned
relocation to not only focus on loss and damage but also (and
primarily) to focus on how these strategies can be promoted,
managed, and integrated into the adaptation framework. The
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement
has an important implication for the post-Kyoto negotiations. It is
therefore highly advisable that population movement as a climate
change adaptation strategy be developed further in the proposals
for the COP 21.
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